What does &dquo;ideology&dquo; mean? As a preliminary step to answering this muchasked question, I collected what seemed to be the most thoughtful and/or influential definitions circulating within the social sciences in the postwar decades. A quick perusal of these definitions reveals the extent to which ideology remains a highly flexible conceptual tool (see Table 1 
1 Since it was not always possible to find a parsimonious statement of the writer's understanding of the concept, in these cases I strung together the most important passages in his or her discussion or paraphrased the discussion. 2 See, e.g., Bennett (1977) , Burks (1949) , Converse (1964) , Eagleton (1991) , Goldie (1989) , Hamilton (1987) , Huaco (1971) , Knight (1990) , Lane (1962) , Larrain (1979) , Lichtheim (1967) , McLellan (1986) , Mullins (1972) , Naess et al. (1956) , Plamenatz (1970) , Putnam (1971) , Roucek (1944) , Sartori (1969) , Seliger (1976) , Shils (1967) , and Szalay and Kelly (1982) . (1960) , Converse (1964) , and McClosky (1964 Sartori's (1970 Sartori's ( : 1038 dictum that &dquo;concept formation stands prior to quantification.&dquo; One must, in other words, have some idea of what one is looking for before one can find it. When concepts are defined &dquo;backwards&dquo;-by working out methods of measurement first-it may only complicate the task of social science inquiry since this encourages a rather facile approach to definition (slapping a term onto a set of empirical findings without much consideration of the terms previous definition, or alternative labels that might be more appropriate). In any case, there has been little discussion of varying usages and meanings of ideology among behavioralists, a matter this study attempts to rectify My hunch is that behavioralists may have more to learn from a close examination of the term-including its usage in other comers of the social science world-than from another empirical wack at the evidence.
Terminological Reshuffling
In the face of ideology's inadequacies, some writers advocate abandoning the term entirely, or at least severely circumscribing its use. Converse (1964) , (1983; 1988) , Feldman and Zaller (1992) , Green (1988) , Hamill et al. (1985) , Inglehart and Klingemann (1979) , Jacoby (1986) , Klingemann (1979) , Knight (1985) , Kritzer (1978) , Luskin (1987 Luskin ( , 1993 , Nelson (1977) , Neuman (1981) , Peffley and Hurwitz (1985) , Searing (1978) , Smith (1980) , Sullivan et (1972) . for example, eschews ideology for &dquo;belief-system&dquo; (see also Naess et al. 1956: 171) . Others have fled from ideology to worldview, attitude, symbol, myth, value, philosophy, rhetoric, culture, and various combinations of these core terms (often qualified by &dquo;system&dquo; or &dquo;political&dquo;). However, attempts (Hall et al. 1977: 46) . Weber, according to McLellan (1986: 35), &dquo;very rarely mentioned the word 'ideology'.&dquo; Pareto spoke of &dquo;derivation,&dquo; Sorel of &dquo;political myth,&dquo; Lukacs of &dquo;class consciousness&dquo; (Plamenatz 1970: 24-27) , and Castoriadis of the &dquo;social imaginary&dquo; (Thompson 1984: 17 Adams (1989) , Althusser (1971) , Bergmann (1951) , Birnbaum (1960) , Carlsnaes (1981) , Cox (1969) , Cunningham (1973) , Dittberner (1979) , Eagleton (1991) , Elster (1982) , Goldie (1989) , Hall et al. (1977) , Halle (1972) , Hirst (1979) , Huaco (1971) , Keohane (1976) , Laclau (1977) , Larrain (1979 Larrain ( , 1983 , Lichtheim (1967 ), Manning (1980 , Manning and Robinson (1985) , McLellan (1986) , Partridge (1961) , Plamenatz (1970) , Ritsert (1990) , Roucek (1944) , Seliger (1976; , Therborn (1980) , Thompson (1984) , and Williams (1988 (Walzer 1969) , the French Revolution (Bendix 1964; Laponce 1981; Mullins 1972: 504; Rejai 1991) , and in a long chain of interconnected developments, including the displacement of &dquo;traditional&dquo; modes of thought, the rise of nation-states, the invention of mass communications media (printing presses, mass circulation newspapers), the installation of democratic regimes and the collapse of the elite monopoly on political power (Bendix 1964; Geertz 1964 Geertz /1973 Loewenstein 1969: 344 11 See, e.g., Converse (1964) , Hamilton (1987) , Huaco (1971) , Mannheim (1960) , Sartori (1969), Seliger (1976 
A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK
The following framework contains all attributes regularly associated with &dquo;ideology&dquo; in contemporary social science discourse, arranged in logically related parts (see Table 2 ). Idiosyncratic usages are ignored.l2 Since there has been so much work devoted explicitly to the meaning of this concept, I draw primarily upon these more selfconscious endeavors, rather than upon works which merely employ the term (defining it summarily, if at all).
l. Location
Where is ideology located-in the mind, in behavior, and or in language? (a) (Thompson 1984: 4) .
(c) The world at-large. A final, and even broader, view of ideology is also possible (and, indeed, quite common (Marx and Engels 1970) . Particular ideologies, Althusser (1971: 159) Geertz (1964 Geertz ( /1973 writes, &dquo;is...the attempt...to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them.&dquo; (b) Repressing. Propaganda, however, is the selfconscious manipulation of symbols to achieve a given effect. Thompson (1984: 86-86) Connolly (1967: 2) , Geertz (1964 Geertz ( /1973 , Gouldner (1976: 85), Lane (1962: 14-15), La Palombara (1966: 5-16 ), Mullins (1972: Smith (1980: 686, 694), Converse (1964), Coveyou and Piereson (1977: 78), Putnam (1971: 655) , and Szalay and Kelly (1982: 586) .
an individual is able to make, but also for the range over which these observations/responses fall (see Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964 Converse , 1990 Smith 1989 (Luskin 1987 (Luskin : 1993 . Writers have been unable to agree, for example, whether sophistication is indicated by a greater or lesser number of dimensions within a given ideology (Luskin 1987: 863 (Ashford 1972: 26; see also Birnbaum 1960: 91; Hamilton 1987 ).
(i) Simplicity. Sutton et al. ( 1956: 4-5;  quoted in Geertz 1964 Geertz /1973 claim that &dquo;Ideology tends to be simple and clear-cut, even where its simplicity and clarity do less than justice.&dquo; Gould and Kolb (1964: 315) In poststructuralist circles ideology is apt to be used as a synonym for &dquo;closure&dquo; -that circumstance in which naturally free-floating processes of signification are blocked or prematurely ended (e.g., Thompson 1984: 196) . Eagleton (1991: 6) (Habermas 1984) , the (unsubstantiated) claim to &dquo;moral certainty&dquo; (Adams 1989: 139; Naess 1956: 166) , the use of unverifiable truth-claims (Sartori 1969: 403 (Bell 1960: 370-71; Neuman 1981 Neuman : 1239 Rejai 1971; Sartori 1969) . In an attempt to reorient the discussion of ideology among mass publics, Sniderman and Tetlock (1986: 63) claim that ideology &dquo;is better understood as a set of root likes and dislikes rather than an assemblage of abstractions.&dquo; It is, therefore, an affective rather than cognitive aspect of thought that may determine how people understand and relate to political issues.
(m) Insincerity. By the same token, ideology has often been used to indicate the speaker's lack of commitment, her insincerity One hears, for example, that politicians reiterate &dquo;ideologies&dquo; which they do not believe and which they do not implement once ensconced in public office. This is ideology in this sense of &dquo;mere ideology,&dquo; and carries the same connotations as &dquo;mere rhetoric.&dquo;
24 See also Barth (1976) , Connolly (1967) , Feuer (1975: 254), Goldman (1969: 103) , Gouldner (1976: 38) , Huaco (1971: 253-55), Lichtheim (1967: (n) Dogmatism. &dquo;It is to the doctrine of the ideologues,&dquo; said Napoleon, &dquo;to this diffuse metaphysics, which in a contrived manner seeks to find the primary causes and on this foundation would erect the legislation of peoples, instead of adapting the laws to a knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history-to which one must attribute all the misfortunes which have befallen our beautiful France&dquo; (quoted in Williams 1983: 154). Marx and Engels (1970: 68) Sartori's (1969: 402) contro- versial claim that &dquo;the ideological mentality represents a typically dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics.&dquo;26 (o) Consciousness. One common view has it that the ideologist should &dquo;be able to explicate those principles&dquo; of the ideology to which he or she is thought to belong (Kritzer 1978: 485-86) . Ideology is &dquo;an explicit, consciously held belief system&dquo; (Putnam 1971: 655) . &dquo;Ideology,&dquo; another writer asserts, &dquo;pertains to that part of consciousness which can be said; it has a public objectivity which enables the projects it promotes to be discussed among strangers&dquo; (Thompson 1984: 85 ). An even stronger sense of explicitness is the achievement of written form. According to Thompson (1984: 85-86 (1962: 265-94) , Bell (1960) , Halle (1972: 116) , Loewenstein (1969: 335), Rokeach (1960) , Sartori (1969) , Shils (1967: 66 (Lichtheim 1967: 31 Levitin and Miller 1979: 752) . Ideology, in this sense, must be considered a proto-conscious phenomenon. Nelson (1977: 580) (Cassel 1984; Luskin 1987 Luskin , 1993 Smith 1980 Smith , 1989 (Sartori 1970 32 The distinction between "deductive" and "psychological" consistency is explored in Nelson (1977) . The best recent reviews of the debate over how to measure coherence (or "constraint") are Knight (1985) , Luskin (1987) and Smith (1989) . The dimensionality debate is discussed in Green (1988), Knight (1984; , and Wilcox and Clausen (1991 (Campbell et al. 1960: 193) 
